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To learn and then have occasion to practice what you 
have learned—is this not satisfying? To have friends 
arrive from afar—is this not a joy? To be patient even 
when others do not understand—is this not the mark of 
the gentleman?” 1
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is not typically seen as having formu-lated a “hermeneutics,” or as being a “hermeneutical thinker,” despite his discussions of the art of interpretation and his 
I appreciate the helpful remarks of the editor and the reviewer. This article sub-
stantially develops my earlier argument in “Leibniz, China, and the Hermeneutics of 
Cross-cultural Understanding,” Einheit in der Vielheit: Akten des VIII. Internationalen 
Leibniz-Kongresses, 2, ed. H. Breger, J. Herbst, and S. Erdner (Hannover: Leibniz Gesell-
schaft, 2006), 700–6. The following abbreviations are used: (BJC) refers to G. W. Leibniz, 
Der Briefwechsel mit den Jesuiten in China (1689–1714), ed. R. Widmaier (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 2006). (WC) refers to G. W. Leibniz, Writings on China, ed. and trans. D. J. Cook 
and H. Rosemont, Jr. (Chicago: Open Court, 1994), including the preface to the Novissima 
Sinica (NS), “On the Civil Cult of Confucius” (CCC), “Remarks on Chinese Rites and 
Religion” (CRR), and “Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese” (NTC).
1. Confucius: Analects, trans. E. Slingerland (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003), 
1:1.
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influence on the development of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
hermeneutics in Germany. Nonetheless, many of his works involve 
issues of how best to interpret texts and other persons. His voluminous 
writings thus contain—at least implicitly—a hermeneutics, or art of 
understanding signs, through his practice of interpretation. Further-
more, hermeneutical concerns are prevalent in a number of Leibniz’s 
international projects. Through various philosophical and practical 
endeavors, Leibniz attempted to reconcile conflicting and seemingly ir-
reconcilable arguments and positions within Western philosophy (ancient 
and modern, Aristotelian and Cartesian, organic-teleological and 
mathematical-mechanical) and Christianity (Protestant and Catholic, 
Western and Orthodox), as well as between western Europe and the 
cultures of Russia, Islam, and China.2 This project of reconciliation 
proceeded through the critical employment of reason and is oriented 
by one of Leibniz’s earlier insights into natural law: in cases of conflict, 
justice calls for maximizing harmony, and harmony is the greatest 
amount of multiplicity compatible with unity.3
Given Leibniz’s importance in the early European reception of 
Chinese culture, and as one of the few early modern figures to argue for 
its value and at times its superiority,4 this paper examines the reality of 
and possibilities for a hermeneutics of intercultural understanding in 
the context of early modern rationalism and the early Enlightenment. 
At first glance, this task does not seem very promising, as representatives 
of the new scientific spirit and mechanical philosophy, such as Robert 
Boyle, used the Chinese as a primary example of the vices of teleologi-
2. In the preface to the Theodicy, Leibniz mentions that Islam does not diverge from 
the truths of natural theology, although only Christianity perfects them. Leibniz, Theodicy: 
Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil (Open Court, 
1988), 51. Leibniz’s interest in reconciliation does not imply a tolerance that precludes 
criticism. However, this does not imply an indifference towards religion and its content, 
as M. R. Antognazza rightly points out in “Leibniz and Religious Toleration,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 622. Yet there is also a basic identity 
between revealed and natural theology such that he can call the Chinese thinking of 
heaven as “pure Christianity” (NTC, §31/ WC 105).
3. Leibniz, Frühe Schriften zum Naturrecht (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 374–75, 296–97.
4. For example, BJC 7, 29, 37, 145, 441. The most accurate, extensive, and philosophi-
cally sophisticated portrayal of Leibniz and China is Franklin Perkins, Leibniz and China: 
A Commerce of Light (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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cal thinking.5 Whereas Boyle associated China with the medieval past, a 
variety of philosophers from Arnauld and Bayle to Malebranche argued 
against Chinese wisdom for its apparent irreligion and materialism. For 
them, it was an inferior—since not yet rational—form of Spinozism.6 
Consequently, these philosophers sided with the Dominicans against 
the Jesuits’ advocacy of “conversion by accommodation” in the Chinese 
Rites Controversy, favoring instead the conversion of the Chinese to a 
Christian European culture.7
Nicolas Malebranche in particular involved himself in the dispute 
over whether the Chinese should retain their traditional practices in 
Christianized form or whether their rites should be eliminated. He 
claimed that he was not criticizing the Jesuit missionaries in his “Advice 
to the Reader” in his polemical Entretien d’un philosophe chretien et d’un 
philosophe chinois (1708), which defended the endeavor of exposing 
and refuting the Chinese by using “concepts they might accept” in order 
to better enable their conversion.8 Despite his claim to the contrary, it 
is clear that it was taken by its readers to be critical of Jesuit attitudes 
toward China and, given the implications of his anti-accommodationist 
arguments, rightfully so.
Malebranche’s guiding hermeneutical maxim is one of doubt and 
suspicion against the Chinese, justified by Christian piety, reducing 
by analogy and apparent conflation the less familiar impieties of the 
Chinese to the more familiar materialistic atheism—as Malebranche 
interpreted it—of Spinoza. According to Malebranche, “It seems to 
me there are many correspondences between the impieties of Spinoza 
and those of the Chinese Philosopher. The change in name would not 
5. Robert Boyle, A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature, ed. E. Davis 
and M. Hunter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 102–3, 150.
6. Y.-T. Lai, “The Linking of Spinoza to Chinese Thought by Bayle and Malebranche,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 23 (April 1985): 151–78.
7. For a historical overview, see G. Minamiki, The Chinese Rites Controversy (Chicago: 
Loyola University Press, 1985), 15–76.
8. N. Malebranche, Dialogue between a Christian Philosopher and a Chinese Philoso-
pher on the Existence and Nature of God, trans. D. A. Iorio (Washington D.C.: University 
Press of America, 1980), 45 and 63. Further compare: D. E. Mungello, “Malebranche and 
Chinese Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 41 (1980): 551–78; Franklin Perkins, 
Commerce of Light, 166.
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change anything in what is essential to my writing.”9 The Chinese are 
monistic materialists without any conception of the true God, and thus 
to rationally understand what they say is already to reject it as irra-
tional.10 Leibniz, as we will see, would counter this universal distrust 
with the principle of charity (i.e., maximizing the rational coherence 
and meaningfulness of the utterances of others) in his own writings on 
China, not of course in opposition to but based on principles he argued 
were basic to Christianity itself, since such hermeneutical suspicion and 
hostility were incompatible with genuine Christian charity and justice, 
and would reduce even the Bible to absurdity and heterodoxy.11
Despite the initially hostile reaction, China would become a signifi-
cant land—both real and imaginary—for the thinkers of the Enlighten-
ment. Both Leibniz and Christian Wolff promoted this transformation 
of attitudes insofar as they advanced the Jesuit view of the rational-
ism inherent in “Chinese”—actually Neo-Confucian12—thought and 
culture. Both thinkers transcended the Jesuit approach by arguing for 
the intrinsic validity and merit of Chinese natural theology (Leibniz) 
or natural morality (Wolff), and for moral-political philosophy inde-
pendent of questions of conversion to Christianity.13 In China, Leibniz 
and Wolff saw fragments of a cosmology in which the universe is ratio-
nally organized according to li 理 (principle) and qi 氣 (vital energy), 
and glimpses of the enlightened philosopher-king who governs with 
wisdom and virtue for the sake of the common good. Jesuit accounts of 
Confucius (Kongfuzi 孔夫子, circa 551–479 BCE) and the “Confucian” 
(rujia 儒家, i.e., the school of the scholars or erudites), principles of ren 仁 (be-
9. Malebranche, Nature of God, 47–48.
10. Ibid., 63–64.
11. NTC §63 / WC 128.
12. Leibniz, like his sources and opponents, conflated the dominant Neo-Confucian 
philosophy with that of the ancient Chinese. Malebranche and Leibniz devote much 
attention to li 理 (pattern, principle or reason), which was a Neo-Confucian term 
developed during the Song Dynasty. Whereas Leibniz interpreted li as part of the rational 
and divine ordering of the universe, Malebranche understood it to be a material principle 
of the immanent organization of nature equivalent to Spinoza’s “God.” Malebranche, 1980, 
47 and 69.
13. BJC 145; Compare Voltaire’s admiration for Chinese wisdom and Wolff ’s inter-
pretation in “On China” in his Philosophical Dictionary, trans. T. Besterman (London: 
Penguin, 2004), 112–15.
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nevolence or humanity) and shu 恕 (reciprocity or mutuality), provided 
evidence for Jesuits that the Chinese knew of the “charity of the wise” 
that seeks true felicity, which is the supreme principle of morality.14 
Leibniz extends this principle to an ethics of interpretation.
There are multiple examples in Leibniz’s writings in which he 
calls on his reader(s) to refrain from drawing dangerous conclusions 
from arguments, such as those of Descartes, out of charity (caritas or 
charité).15 Leibniz’s engagement with China is informed by his use of 
the principles of “charity,” which discovers or reconstructs the internal 
rationality and truth of the other’s first-person self-interpretations, and 
“understanding better,” which locates the truth of the other’s position 
in an external source or standard. Whereas charity calls for interpret-
ing others as aiming at uttering what is most reasonable or genuinely 
expressive of their own condition, “understanding better” interprets 
them as not uttering what is most reasonable or genuinely expressive of 
their own condition. Whereas the first reaches out to what is different—
albeit in the case of Leibniz, in order to promote harmony on the basis 
of its own agenda rather than for the sake of “alterity” or difference in 
and of itself—the latter requires, at its most extreme in what Schleier-
macher described as the “Wut des Verstehens” (fury of understanding), 
the refutation and sublimation of difference. At the two extremes of 
interpretation, Chinese rites are either recognized by the interpreter as 
having their own internal validity, potentially incommensurable with 
their own standards, or these rites are considered intrinsically false and 
immoral. In contrast, Leibniz emphasized maximizing multiplicity 
and harmony, charity and rational judgment in his approach to China, 
and accordingly employed a “double hermeneutic” in which these two 
principles moderate each other.
Leibniz defines justice as the “charity of the wise,” and uses this 
principle not only in his practical philosophy, but also to interpret the 
statements of others in such a way as to maximize their meaning and to 
14. On the charity of the wise, see Patrick Riley, “Leibniz’s Méditation sur la notion 
commune de la justice (1703–2003),” The Leibniz Review 13 (Dec. 2003): 67–81; and, on its 
Pauline and Augustinian basis, “Leibniz on Justice as the Charity of the Wise,” Jahrbuch 
für Recht und Ethik  8 (2000): 143–58.
15. BJC 130.
282 Leibniz and China
minimize undue suspicion. Significantly, in contrast with more episte-
mological and ontological accounts of hermeneutics, Leibniz’s charity 
not only entails maximizing the rationality of the utterances of others, 
but also ethical care (caritas) for the other. Appealing to the example 
of St. Paul, Leibniz uses the principle of charity to critically interpret 
Chinese beliefs (or their “true core”) as consistent with natural theology 
and “true Christianity.” He rejected the suspicion of authors such as 
Malebranche, who interpreted the Chinese as immoral, irrational, and 
irreligious. The second principle of “understanding better” is based on 
the early church fathers’ reinterpretation of Hebrew and Greek texts as 
implicitly containing Christian truths that reveal the “true meaning” of 
the texts. The maxim of “understanding authors better than they un-
derstood themselves” seems to coincide with the principle of charity. 
Yet, even though understanding can be said to preserve truth and to 
maximize agreement and harmony, primary aspirations for Leibniz, it 
threatens to transform charity toward others into assimilation of alterity 
to the sameness of the self.
This paper examines questions of interpretation in Leibniz and 
Wolff ’s approach to China in the context of its significance for the de-
velopment of hermeneutics in eighteenth-century Germany, and its 
import for addressing issues of cross-cultural interpretation.
The Hermeneutics of Suspicion
It is contestable whether Leibniz or Malebranche offered the more 
accurate account of neo-Confucian thought, given the confusions 
and conflations already involved in their sources and heightened by 
their own interests and agendas. Robert Louden has justifiably argued 
that Leibniz and Wolff served philosophical, political, and religious 
purposes that had more to do with their own concerns than with those 
of the Chinese.16 Even if such hermeneutical suspicions are valid, which 
they undoubtedly are, it can be argued that the approach pioneered by 
16. R. Louden, “ ‘What Does Heaven Say?’ Christian Wolff and Western Interpreta-
tions of Confucian Ethics,” in Confucius and the Analects: New Essays, ed. B. W. Van 
Norden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 73–93.
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Leibniz and continued by Wolff opened up possibilities for reflection on 
and dialogue with Chinese thought in ways that other existing perspec-
tives precluded.
More troublesome are the strategies of explanation—unfolded since 
Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud—described by Paul Ricoeur as an exercise 
in interpretive distrust. The “hermeneutics of suspicion” deciphers 
impersonal third-person truths from self-deceptive first-person ex-
pressions and self-interpretations.17 The point of this strategy of distrust 
is that forms of rationality—and consequently of understanding and 
interpretation—are tied to and implicated in domination, such that en-
countering and engaging the other is inevitably an exercise in power.
Jon Elster has contended that Leibniz’s model of rationality is in-
tertwined with the formation of early modern capitalism, and that his 
internationalism reflects the growing mobility of capital and the search 
for new domains and resources.18 According to this logic, Leibniz’s 
efforts for the cosmopolitan exchange of knowledge and goods similarly 
echo the development of European colonialism. Be that as it may, the 
suspicion that a given form of rationality is domination needs to be 
shown through research rather than through assumptions. Reducing 
history to the history of the West, even if to criticize it for its occlusion 
of the other, omits the facticity and alterity of other cultures and social 
realities, which are never entirely Western constructs to the extent that 
they are already at work and are affecting how they are interpreted. The 
encounter between Europe and China is not merely an imposition of 
Western categories onto Eastern material.19 At some level, there needs 
to be an acknowledgment of a moment of genuine difference or alterity 
if critique is to avoid being the reproduction of the Eurocentrism that it 
is criticizing. If alterity or otherness—including the self-interpretations 
of others—is ethically and hermeneutically important, as recent philos-
ophers such as Emmanuel Levinas have insisted, then suspicion should 
17. P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay in Interpretation, trans. D. Savage 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 32–36.
18. J. Elster, Leibniz et la formation de l’esprit capitaliste (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 
1975).
19. On the Jesuit and subsequent Western construction of Confucianism, see L. M. Jensen, 
Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and Universal Civilization (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1997).
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be directed at ourselves as interpreters and not exclusively toward the 
other person being interpreted.20
Leibniz and Wolff ’s efforts to engage Chinese thought cannot 
be a one-way street to colonizing the other to the extent that their 
cross-cultural interpretive strategies opened their own and “European” 
thinking to ideas and practices from another world, justified criticism 
and suggestions to reform European practices and institutions, and 
influenced the subsequent development of European philosophy.21 
Although David Mungello justifiably describes Leibniz’s position as 
“Eurocentric cosmopolitanism,”22 this paper will differentiate as far as 
possible from our own current “hermeneutical situation,” what is merely 
Eurocentric and what might be genuinely cosmopolitan and dialogical 
in Leibniz’s writings concerning China, by examining the scope, limits, 
and potential violence of the interpretive practice of maximizing mean-
ingfulness and rationality through the maxims of (1) charity and (2) 
“understanding better” than the authors themselves.
Rationality and Interpretation: A Preliminary 
Argument
Who are the Chinese, according to Leibniz? In the preface to the 
Novissima Sinica (1697/1699), a collection of materials about China, 
Leibniz remarks that the Chinese should be addressed as an ancient and 
cultivated people who are equal to or who surpass Europe in a number of 
ways.23 This remark is not accidental, as Leibniz devoted much attention 
to encouraging the intellectual, moral, and scientific exchange between 
China and Europe. Such an exchange partly motivated his correspon-
20. For further discussion, see my forthcoming article, “Levinas and Early Confucian 
Ethics: Religion, Rituality, and the Sources of Morality,” Levinas Studies 4, ed. Jeffrey 
Bloechl (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2009).
21. German philosophy from Leibniz to Heidegger has already been impacted by 
Chinese and Indian thought. Martin Schönfeld has convincingly shown the influence of 
Chinese “content” on Leibniz, Wolff, and subsequent German philosophy, including—
despite his hostility—Kant, in “From Confucius to Kant: The Question of Information 
Transfer,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33, no. 1 (Jan 2006): 67–81.
22. Mungello, “Chinese Philosophy,” 551.
23. NS §2 / WC 46.
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dence with the modernizing Russian czar Peter the Great, as Leibniz 
hoped communication and exchange would be promoted through the 
mediation of Russia.24 Leibniz formulated his motivation in terms of a 
religiously based cosmopolitanism when he wrote to Peter: “For I am 
not one of those impassioned patriots of one country alone, but I work 
for the well-being of the whole of mankind, for I consider heaven as my 
country and cultivated men as my compatriots.”25
Leibniz’s Chinese writings provide us with a “test case” of the 
relation between rationality and the possibility—via an “enlightened” 
cosmopolitan and dialogical attitude—of genuine intercultural inter-
pretation and mutual understanding. This paper examines this “test 
case” in response to the question: Do some practices and varieties of 
reasoning and interpretation better enable and promote encountering 
and engaging others or what is different from oneself?
There are three preliminary reasons why the question of rationality 
might make a difference in the context of Leibniz’s thought, given that 
Leibniz was initially hostile to Chinese culture. First, despite caricatures 
of the supposed dogmatism of early modern rationalism, Leibniz’s 
rationalism is more experimental and hypothesis-driven because of 
its more formal character. This is illustrated by Leibniz’s insistence 
throughout the Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716) 
that the reception of Chinese thought proceed through hypotheses elu-
cidating the meaning of what is said without prematurely jumping to 
conclusions via suspicions such as those of Malebranche. Although he 
modified the model of the geometrical method that proceeded from 
one foundational truth, involving some particular content such as the 
Cartesian cogito, Leibniz articulated nature and the divine based on 
the use of reason, which combined metaphysical and mathematical 
deductive reasoning with the hypothetical-experimental methods of 
the new sciences.
It was Leibniz’s generalization and formalization of rationality on 
the basis of the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason—
24. See Foucher de Careil, Oeuvre de Leibniz (Paris, 1875), 7:506–9; “On the Academy 
of Arts and Sciences (Letter to Peter the Great, 1716),” in Leibniz, ed. P. Wiener (New 
York, Scribner’s, 1951), 594–99.
25. Leibniz, “Academy of Arts,” 597.
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which Wolff interpreted Confucius as applying to moral truths and 
Leibniz as most fully developing26—that created the conditions for the 
greater coordination of reason and experimentation. This rational-
experimental model is embodied in Leibniz’s interpretive practices. 
Given the practical concerns that Leibniz addressed with the resources 
of his model of rationality, reason could not be restrained to its theo-
retical or speculative function. Rationality is not only an instrument 
of the growth and exchange of scientific and technical knowledge, 
but of moral, political, and religious insights that are all necessary for 
enlightened progress. According to Leibniz, the adoption of such a 
concept of reason would consequently provide the means for various 
individuals and groups—of divergent and conflicting belief systems—
to come to some sort of agreement and consensus about basic truths.27 
In contrast with Locke’s privative or negative justification of tolerance 
based on human lack of certainty about knowledge, Leibniz contends 
that we all partake of the truth to various degrees—just as each monad 
expresses the truth in its own more or less clear and distinct way.28 Con-
sequently, tolerance enables communication and intellectual argument. 
It does not preclude the achievement of truth, as anti-pluralists fear, but 
is instead its very condition.
Second, as Robert Adams has argued about Leibniz’s ecumenical-
ism, Leibniz developed a “principled pragmatism” concerning reli-
giously divisive issues.29 Although Leibniz often argued for strategies of 
pragmatic accommodation, such as agreement and exchange because 
of its utility to various parties, these strategies are more deeply justified 
26. C. Wolff, Erste Philosophie oder Ontologie (Hamburg: Meiner, 2005), §71.
27. This agreement is not the purely formal consensus attributed to Habermas, as it 
retains moral and religious content that can be interpreted as being in accord with one 
another through a pragmatically oriented principle of charity. The question whether a 
purely formal consensus is possible or whether it requires “mutual understanding” about 
natural theology remains at issue in the contemporary possibility of mutual understand-
ing between the “West” and “Islam.”
28. F. Perkins makes this point contrasting Locke and Leibniz in his account of 
tolerance in Leibniz, “Virtue, Reason, and Cultural Exchange,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 63, no. 3 (2002): 446–47.
29. R. Adams, “Leibniz’s Conception of Religion,” in Proceedings of the 20th World 
Congress of Philosophy, vol. 7, ed. M. D. Gedney (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documenta-
tion Center, 2000).
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by Leibniz’s practical philosophy, which is oriented toward felicity and 
the common good.30 Accordingly, Leibniz is pragmatic, and, in principle, 
committed to moral and religious universalism and cosmopolitanism, 
since all peoples and individuals are inherently capable—at least in 
principle—of knowing the principles of natural morality and natural 
theology. On the basis of these natural principles, knowable through 
reason and the human heart, Leibniz affirmed the possibility of mutual 
rational understanding and reconciliation emerging between divergent 
(Calvinist and Lutheran), antagonistic (Protestant and Catholic), 
separated (Eastern and Western Christianity), and seemingly utterly 
foreign (Chinese and European) belief systems. However, for Leibniz, 
this commitment to formal rationality and tolerance cannot mean in-
difference to all content.31 It cannot exclude argument and disagree-
ment, nor even conflict and war. Although aversion to war is the higher 
moral principle, one that he finds to a greater degree in China than in 
Christian Europe, Leibniz maintains that “even the good must cultivate 
the arts of war, so that the evil may not gain power over everything.”32
Third, it is insufficient to focus only on the content of Leibniz’s 
ethics, that is, individual and common happiness, since these are to be 
promoted as perfections or virtues through reflection and the use of 
reason. For Leibniz, perfections are not justified simply as pleasures 
through hedonism, but rather—in Aristotelian terms—eudemonisti-
cally and prudentially as part of a disposition towards justice, which 
is understood as the coordination of sentiment and reason. Likewise, 
in an early reading of Confucian morality as an exemplary and experi-
mental rather than a rule-based ethics, Wolff focuses on how Confucian 
ethics provide concrete models of perfection in “emperors and philoso-
phers” for moral life.33
30. See especially “Felicity” in Political Writings, ed. P. Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 82–84; Leibniz, “La Félicité,” in Textes inédits d’après les manuscrits 
de la Bibliothèque provinciale de Hanovre, ed. Gaston Grua (Paris: Presses universitaires de 
France, 1948), 2:579–80.
31. See M. R. Antognazza, “Religious Toleration,” 620–22. However, Leibniz’s discus-
sion of the Chinese, as we will see, suggests modifying the strength of her conclusion.
32. NS §2 / WC 46.
33. C. Wolff, Rede über die praktische Philosophie der Chinesen (Hamburg: Meiner, 
1985), 46–47, 56–57.
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Leibniz argued in his early work on natural law that charity and 
justice cannot be separated, as charity provides the measure of justice, 
and universal justice is love of all.34 Justice is the charity of the wise, 
intelligent goodwill, and universal benevolence.35 Leibniz’s notion of 
practical reason demands charity not only in a limited sense but also 
charity in all things. This includes charity in understanding and in-
terpretation, since these are also types of action and perfection, and 
thus also part of ethics. Recognizing the potential validity and merit of 
Chinese thought—as internally rational in such a way that is externally 
recognized or reconstructed—is explicitly connected with Leibniz’s 
basic moral principle of justice as the charity of the wise. Unity and 
multiplicity need not therefore be conflicting values in communicating 
with and approaching the other.
Enlightenment and Christianity: Leibniz on Charity 
and Understanding Better
It is most true . . . that one cannot know God without 
loving one’s brother, that one cannot have wisdom 
without having charity (which is the real touchstone of 
virtue), and that one even advances one’s own good in 
working for that of others.36
34. Leibniz, Frühe Schriften zum Naturrecht, 302–3, 240–41.
35. “Pleasure is nothing other than a perception of perfection. Perfection is a 
magnitude of being, or that through which a being is more than it otherwise would be, so 
that the science of perfection consists as it were in a metaphysical art of measurement. Yet 
because pleasure is often mixed with displeasure, so that we perceive both at once and at 
one time one is increased and at another time it is decreased, so joy results from an excess 
of pleasure and sorrow from an excess of displeasure. From this can finally be concluded 
that happiness is a condition of lasting joy and unhappiness a condition of lasting sorrow 
and, consequently, that all our thoughts are directed toward how we can achieve happiness 
and thus a lasting surplus of our improvement in the perception of true perfections.” 
Leibniz, “Of the Highest Good,” in Die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz, ed. C. I. 
Gerhardt (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1960–61), 7: 111–17.
36. Leibniz, “Felicity,” 84.
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Leibniz was involved in a massive correspondence about various forms 
of reconciliation within Europe, especially ecumenicalism and the 
possibility of reunifying the Christian churches. If Christians could 
agree on basic principles of reason, he argued, radical divisions about 
questions such as whether Christ was physically or symbolically present 
in the bread and wine would fall away as secondary. Although this in 
itself is an interesting topic about ethically relating to and interpret-
ing the other, when the other is quite close yet seemingly so far away, I 
want to explore in more detail a different case emerging from the Jesuit 
attempt to convert the Chinese to Christianity by adopting themselves 
to Chinese primarily established Neo-Confucian philosophical ideas 
and social practices.
The debate between the Jesuits (organized around the missionary 
and translation work of Matteo Ricci37) and their critics (Franciscan and 
other missionaries, as well as philosophers such as Arnauld, Bayle, and 
Malebranche) centered on two questions: (1) whether the “Confucian” 
(ru 儒) system, which dominated Chinese life, was to be accepted as a 
philosophical and civil ethical-political system or rejected as a pagan 
and idolatrous religiosity or (2) whether aspects of Chinese belief and 
practice, even religious ones, were acceptable to Christians because they 
were in accordance with natural theology, if not, in Leibniz’s language, 
perfected through Christian-revealed theology. If the first interpreta-
tion was correct, such that one was not merely publicly honoring but re-
ligiously worshipping ancestors in ancestral rites, this would contradict 
both traditional Christian doctrine and the Jesuit attempt at immanent 
conversion from “the inside,” and would have to be rejected as intrinsi-
cally detrimental to the Christian faith.38
Some authors interpret this dispute as a narrow theological debate 
without philosophical import, which could not have influenced Leibniz’s 
37. Matteo Ricci discussed the relative merits of translating the Christian notion of 
God via traditional Chinese expressions such as “heaven” (Tian 天) and “lord on high,” 
(Shangdi 上帝) or a new expression (“sovereign of heaven”) in his Tianzhu shiyi 天主实
义 / The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, trans. D. Lancashire and P. H. Kuo-chen (St. 
Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1985).
38. For a discussion of Leibniz on the reunification of Christendom and the Chinese 
rites controversy in the context of his philosophy of religion, see R. Adams, “Conception 
of Religion,” 2000.
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philosophy but be only an occasion for its application.39 However, 
Leibniz’s intervention brought philosophical issues to bear, primarily 
the status of natural theology and morality, and addressed questions 
of a hermeneutics of the other. In his writings concerning Chinese 
rituals and natural theology, Leibniz employed two interpretive prin-
ciples: (1) the maxim of charity that calls for maximizing the immanent 
or internal rationality of the interpreted as such and in general;40 and 
(2) the maxim of “understanding the author better than he/she under-
stands him/herself ” that calls for the maximization of the rationality of 
the interpreted according to one’s own external standards of rationality 
and truth. These two principles allow understanding Chinese beliefs as 
compatible with reason.
Leibniz employed in his Chinese texts a “double hermeneutic” 
accenting the particularity and truth of the Christian faith (as the per-
fection of revealed theology) while simultaneously reorienting this 
faith beyond pious condemnation. Instead of suspicion, reason calls for 
realizing the greatest amount of agreement and harmony with other 
systems of belief through the identification of the basic truths shared by 
revealed and natural theology. Based on the content of their practices 
rather than their general theological beliefs, Leibniz contended that the 
Chinese could be practicing a kind of Christianity that in many ways 
was more Christian than what was practiced by the officially Christian 
Europeans.41 Since Leibniz is not known for trying to shock his readers, 
rather the contrary, and the Pietists condemned Wolff for similar senti-
ments a few decades later,42 Leibniz’s pronouncements should be taken 
sincerely. This is possible not because Leibniz was secretly irreligious, 
as has been argued by one line of Leibniz interpretation since Bertrand 
39. M. Fischer, “Leibniz und die Chinesische Philosophie,” Conceptus: Zeitschrift fuer 
Philosophie 22 (1988): 3–18.
40. NTC §10–13 / WC 84–86. Also note how interpretation is taken as requiring 
equity (§10).
41. NTC, §31/ WC 105.
42. On Wolff ’s Pietist critics, see H.-M. Gerlach, Christian Wolff: seine Schule und seine 
Gegner (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001); G. Becker, “Pietism’s Confrontation with Enlightenment 
Rationalism: An Examination of the Relation between Ascetic Protestantism and Science,” 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 30 (June 1991): 139–58; K. Deppermann, 
“August Hermann Francke,” Orthodoxie und Pietismus (Stuttgart: W Kohlhammer, 1982), 
241–60.
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Russell, but because religion is identified with morality and both with 
the divine organization of the world that is revealed to reason, as well 
as to faith.
According to Leibniz, the morality and natural theology of the 
Chinese is good (bon) and akin to what is seen in Job and others prior 
to Moses and the establishment of the law.43 As will be discussed below, 
Wolff went further than Leibniz by drawing the analogy directly between 
Confucius and Moses as legislators for a people. Whereas Wolff dif-
ferentiated religion and ethics more thoroughly, natural theology and 
natural morality are inseparable in Leibniz’s thought, and their identity 
is both a problem and an orienting point for his defense of Chinese 
moral life.
Leibniz employed the principle of charity, which is part of justice 
for him, throughout his writings when he argued, for example, that 
good sense could be made of even the strangest of doctrines, such as 
those of the scholastics, occasionalists, and vitalists. These doctrines 
and writings are not merely false and confused but contain their own 
immanent rationale that the interpreter attempts to discover. In his 
Chinese writings, Leibniz justified the employment of the principle 
of charity by appealing to both philosophical and religious grounds. 
First, it usefully promotes the understanding and agreement needed 
to develop the communication and exchange that is beneficial to all 
parties. Second, not only is it pragmatically justified by prudential self-
interest in happiness, it is in accordance with the genuine truth and 
best practice of Christianity itself. That is to say, at least Christianity 
according to Leibniz’s philosophical reconstruction of it.
Franklin Perkins has shown how controversies over the mysteries and 
sectarianism had obscured natural theology in Leibniz’s estimation, 
and Albert Ribas has depicted the philosophical context for Leibniz’s 
“defense of Chinese natural religion” in response to the “decadence of 
natural religion” that played a role in his controversy with Clarke.44 In 
addition, however, Leibniz’s argument has a directly Christian ethical 
43. BJC 467.
44. Perkins, “Cultural Exchange,” 459; Albert Ribas, “Leibniz’s Discourse on the 
Natural Theology of the Chinese and the Leibniz-Clarke Controversy,” Philosophy East 
and West 53, no. 1 (Jan. 2003): 64–86.
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context that should be emphasized. The fundamental truth of Christi-
anity for Leibniz is disclosed in the Pauline perfections of faith, hope, 
and charity (or love). Leibniz explicitly connected the hermeneuti-
cal principle of charity (i.e., how to interpret others) with the ethical 
practice of charity (i.e., how to regard others) recommended by St. Paul. 
By widening what should be considered acceptable to Christians and 
by secularizing practices condemned as belonging to a false religion, 
Leibniz rejected Arnauld’s upbraiding of the Jesuits for their laxity con-
cerning the Chinese. For Leibniz, “Following the example of Paul they 
ought to be all things to all men, and the honors given to Confucius 
seem to have nothing of religious adoration in them.”45 Leibniz re-
peatedly refers to the example of Paul. He claims that if there are no 
grave reasons to the contrary, “it is advisable to give it [the civil cult 
of Confucius] the most favorable meaning—as the Apostle Paul is said 
to have done in taking the altar erected to the unknown god as having 
been instituted by the Athenians for rites which they ought to have 
celebrated.”46
Leibniz associates Paul’s emphasis on charity, as love for the 
other, with his making the best possible sense of the other. Leibniz’s 
Platonic Pauline charity—as the justice and universal benevolence that 
is the charity of the wise, caritas sapientis seu benevolentia universa-
lis—grounds both his ethics and his hermeneutics. Interpretation in-
herently involves ethical claims, and ethics is understood partly from 
the Pauline and Augustinian moral tradition in which love (charity) is 
greater than even faith and hope. Leibniz differentiated himself from 
this tradition, however, by stressing how charity is guided by wisdom in 
order to achieve felicity, the happiness and perfection of the individual 
and humanity.47 This strategy resonates with Confucian benevolence 
or humanity (ren), particularly Mencius’s (Mengzi 孟子, circa 380–300 
BCE) analysis of benevolence as deriving from natural moral feelings 
and sentiments, and the potential Chinese sources for the embrace of 
45. NS §11 / WC 51.
46. CCC §9 / WC 63, CRR §9 / WC 74; BJC 245, 297.
47. P. Riley, “Leibniz’s Political and Moral Philosophy in the ‘Novissima Sinica,’ ” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 60, no. 2 (1999): 217–39.
293Religion in the Age of Enlightenment
nature as already moral in some figures of the early and later Enlighten-
ment have not yet been adequately considered.
Leibniz’s moral and political philosophy, as a universal jurispru-
dence that includes both God and humanity, corresponds to his project 
of theodicy and rational theology. Theodicy is the justification of God’s 
justice from the human perspective of the apparent evils of the world, just 
as natural theology is the divine considered according to the order of 
nature from the perspective of reason. Nature cannot be thought of 
simply as a world without God, according to Leibniz, since the question 
“Why is there something rather than nothing?” drives human reason to 
something other than the world as its source. Natural theology concerns 
the “kingdom of grace” as the government of a world justly organized 
for rational minds.
For Leibniz, justice rightly conceived is “the charity of the wise that 
is universal benevolence.” This definition, according to Patrick Riley, 
fuses Platonic-geometrizing “wisdom,” Pauline “charity,” and Augustin-
ian “good will” (bona voluntas). In his preface to the Novissima Sinica, 
Leibniz argues that wisdom, charity, and goodwill are to be found more 
truly in Chinese moral-political practices than in those of Europe.48 
Because of their moral and political practices, which Leibniz interprets 
as more just, tolerant, and peaceful than those of Europe, the Chinese 
are already better Christians than Europeans. They would be even more 
so if they were to become actual Christians.
The principle of charity led Leibniz to affirm the rationality and at 
times the superiority of Chinese beliefs and practices. This is only one 
side of Leibniz’s hermeneutics, however, given that the maxims of char-
itable interpretation and “understanding better” restrain each other. 
Leibniz did not argue for unlimited interpretive charity, as Europeans 
“must be able to interpret their ancient books better than the erudites 
themselves,” analogously to how the early Christian responded to the 
books of the ancient Hebrews. Nonetheless, Leibniz constrained this 
48. Compare Riley, “Moral Philosophy,” 230–33; Yu Liu argues that Leibniz was 
deeply affected between 1667 and 1700/01 by the Jesuits propaganda about China being 
a benevolent despotism compatible with both Christian charity and the rule of the 
philosopher-king in “From Christian Platonism to Organism: The Two Chinas of Leibniz,” 
International Philosophical Quarterly 41, no. 4 (Dec. 2001): 439–51.
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assimilative maxim, which has seen so much abuse, by proposing that 
“it will become evident that the Chinese themselves understand better 
than was thought, or at least that their public doctrines demand no 
more than what we are able to concede.”49 Charity then takes relative 
precedence over the maxim of understanding others better than they 
understand themselves, which Schleiermacher and Dilthey identified 
with understanding (verstehen) the unconscious and the unthought of 
an author and Heidegger with an exposure to “a content in which we 
ourselves can grow.”50
The priority of charity over “understanding better” can be seen, for 
instance, when Leibniz contends further that just as Europeans should 
establish missions in the areas in which they are superior, so too should 
the Chinese establish missions in Europe in the areas of life that they 
have perfected, such as in the moral and political realm.51 Leibniz’s goal 
of a universal exchange involving mutuality and reciprocity based on 
reason and justice seems incompatible with a colonial relation. Further, 
this mutuality is based on the idea of natural morality and theology 
being shared by both peoples—at least to some degree, which is suf-
ficient to justify charitable rather than mistrustful interpretation. Even 
if, for Leibniz, the Chinese should become true Christians not only in 
the natural but in the revealed sense, this should occur by means of the 
dialogue, accommodation, and assimilation that Leibniz—doubtless 
ahistorically—perceived in St. Paul and “the Church Fathers who inter-
preted Plato and the other philosophers in a Christian fashion.”52
The maxim of understanding the author better than the author 
understood him/herself (or the tradition understood itself) entailed 
that Christians needed to interpret the Chinese classics better than 
the Chinese themselves in order to convert them, just as Christians 
believed they had previously interpreted Greek philosophy better than 
the Greeks did, and the Hebrew Bible better than the Hebrews, through 
49. CCC §11 and 13 / WC 64.
50. Wilhelm Dilthey, Hermeneutics and the Study of History, ed. R. Makkreel and F. 
Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 147; Martin Heidegger, Phenom-
enological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Emad and K. Maly 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 4–5.
51. NS §10 / WC 51; BJC 521–23.
52. CCC §9 and NTC §63 / WC 63, 128; BJC 253–55, 577.
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their superior and more complete revelation.53 Leibniz modified but 
did not abandon the assimilative tone of this maxim by making it a 
principle of dialogue and rational rather than coercive conversion, yet 
we also find here the potential limits of Leibnizian intercultural com-
munication. Given Leibniz’s argument, it should also be the case that 
dialogue could produce the “conversion” of European to Chinese forms 
of life if their principles could (1) better create wisdom and happiness 
for Europeans and (2) if they understand European tradition better 
than the Europeans themselves in order to further their improvement.
If “understanding better” is to be more than an opportunistic 
stratagem, as in Leibniz’s letters with the Jesuits discussing indirect 
methods of conversion, it is mutual, reversible, and open to the best 
possible rational interpretation. Likewise, if ethics is dialogical and cos-
mopolitan, even if this is derived from European sources, its outcome 
cannot be controlled except insofar as it is in accord with the dangerous 
game of producing conviction through rational argument. Leibniz’s cos-
mopolitan ethics in some sense has to be Eurocentric, given its context 
and sources, yet he stressed—if he did not consistently practice—the 
mutuality of learning from and teaching others as well as charity in 
the broadest sense in order to enable precisely such exchanges. Chari-
table interpretation is justified through both pragmatic and religious 
reasons based on ultimately humanistic ethical grounds.
Leibniz uses “understanding the other better than he/she under-
stands herself ” self-critically in regard to Europe, since Europeans, as 
part of their progress, should strive for a more perfect and moral way of 
life. Despite the limits of Leibniz’s model, when Leibniz makes Christi-
anity the truth of Confucian and neo-Confucian beliefs while excluding 
Buddhism and Daoism (which he labels, following his sources, as idola-
trous and sorcerous), it is the principle of Pauline charity applied to 
interpretative questions that opened up his own perspective to the per-
spective of the other, however inadequately understood. This helped 
him achieve a positive, if fragmentary and imperfect, recognition and 
appreciation of Chinese thought and practices in their own terms as 
53. CCC §11 / WC 64; BJC 487.
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well as his own. Such an understanding of the other’s self-understanding 
is elemental to hermeneutics.
Although the Christian faith remained an ultimate yet indemon-
strable truth for Leibniz, this claim was not used to exclude rational 
argumentation and inquiry.54 Indeed, Leibniz affirmed the compatibil-
ity and the necessity of faith for reason, and interpreted religion as the 
only genuine universal and cosmopolitan society. Since morality 
is inseparable from religious belief for Leibniz, there cannot be a 
universal cosmopolitanism that lacks reference to and context in a par-
ticular nexus of beliefs and practices, such as the enlightened Chris-
tianity that consists of the charity of the wise. If it turns out that this 
Christian content makes a difference to Leibniz’s project of an enlight-
ened and cosmopolitan ethics, then the subtraction of cultural and 
religious content (whether Christian, Chinese, or otherwise) potential-
ly threatens to turn intercultural dialogue into an empty discourse in 
which formal agreement is posited at the expense of the rich plurality of 
and reasonable argumentation between concrete forms of life.
Leibniz’s Legacy in Christian Wolff
Zilu asked about serving ghosts and spirits. The Master 
said, “You are not even able to serve people, how can 
you serve ghosts and spirits?” 
       “May I inquire about death?” 
       “You do not even understand life, how can you 
understand death?” 55
A question one might ask of Leibniz’s practice of interpretation: Does 
the principle of charity—which calls for approaching the interpreted 
from its own perspective or from its own internal standard—comple-
ment or contradict the principle of “understanding better”—which 
54. A. Bardon examined the consistency of Leibniz’s interpretation of the Christian 
mysteries as true yet incomprehensible to human understanding in “Leibniz on the 
Epistemic Status of the Mysteries,” Philosophy and Theology 13, no. 1 (2001): 143–58.
55. Attributed to Confucius, Analects, 11.12.
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operates according to one’s own standard of what counts as rational—
and can dialogue between different religions, philosophies, and cultures 
be based on either or both premises? That is, in the case of Leibniz, does 
rational hermeneutics achieve what it aims to accomplish?
Leibniz’s project of promoting the conditions for cross-cultural com-
munication and exchange based on pragmatic strategies of charitable 
interpretation, which are oriented by a moral conception of reason and 
religious understanding of human nature, raised difficult questions that 
would continue to haunt Wolff in the next generation. In this section, 
I will briefly summarize a strategy for interpreting Wolff ’s approach to 
China that extends and supports the account of Leibniz articulated in 
this paper.
Wolff explicitly switches the debate concerning the Chinese from 
the issue of natural theology to that of natural morality. Of course, 
natural theology was already primarily natural morality for Leibniz, and 
Wolff was also committed to the project of natural theology as much as 
Leibniz was.56 This transition is important, however, as Wolff articulates 
to a greater degree the idea that natural morality is prior to and separate 
from any type of theology. The bracketing of “natural theology” entailed 
that the interpretation of Chinese culture could proceed on the basis 
of common and overlapping moral truths while excluding the divisive 
theological concerns at the heart of the Chinese rites controversy.
Wolff ’s lecture on “The Practical Philosophy of the Chinese” (1721) 
emphasizes, as Leibniz already had, the superiority of Chinese moral 
and political practices over those of the Europeans. Keeping in mind 
one strategy of the Enlightenment that idealized the foreign in order 
to critique the native, as in Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, Wolff moves 
the issue from natural theology to natural morality based on a meta-
physical and natural scientific account of the “forces of nature.” These 
natural forces inform both human nature and its rationality. Like Kant 
later in the eighteenth century, Wolff argues that morality does not pre-
suppose or require religion, not even in the rational form of natural 
56. See Charles Corr’s account of the role of natural theology in Wolff ’s philosophy in 
“The Existence of God, Natural Theology, and Christian Wolff,” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 4 (1973): 105–18.
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theology, and that at most religion is the fulfillment of morality.57 For 
Wolff, Europeans could communicate and learn from the Chinese on 
the basis of rationality and a common human nature. In Wolff ’s lecture 
on Chinese morality, Wolff provocatively compares Confucius to Jesus 
and Moses as exemplary figures of wisdom, and affirms the moral and 
political superiority of the pagan Chinese over the Christian Europeans 
in pursuing natural morality in accordance with the “forces of nature” 
(Kräfte der Natur).58
Wolff ’s lecture was subsequently first published by his Pietist 
opponents. Wolff compares Confucius to Jesus only in his function as 
a teacher who provided a measure for ethics and politics, and argues 
that Confucius had a more similar role and comportment to Moses.59 
This publication led to his condemnation by the Pietists, his expulsion 
from the University of Halle and Prussia at the order of the monarch, and 
initiated a second European-wide controversy over Chinese ethics 
and politics in comparison with those of Europe.60 Despite famously 
mocking Leibniz in Candide for his perfectionism, a principle Wolff 
also maintained, Voltaire defended the Leibnizian Wolff for praising 
and doing justice to the Chinese.61
Wolff ’s proto-Kantian argument for the autonomy of ethics did not 
lead him to reject religion. He retained a supplementary and fulfill-
ing role for natural and revealed theology in his philosophy. Because 
of his advocacy of enlightened religion, Wolff was condemned by the 
Pietists for marginalizing revelation.62 The Pietists not only feared his 
rationalism; they also noticed that Wolff focused on moral and political 
forms of life in his reflections on China and that he did not address 
questions of faith. He did not address the religious exchange between 
57. For a discussion of the “autonomy of morality” in Wolff and the importance of 
this claim in his interpretation of China, see Julia Ching, “Christian Wolff and China: The 
Autonomy of Morality,” Filozofska Istrazivanja 29, no. 2 (1989): 441–48; and the intro-
duction to J. Ching and W. G. Oxtoby, Moral Enlightenment: Leibniz and Wolff on China 
(Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, 1992).
58. Wolff, Philosophie der Chinesen, 50–51, 116–21.
59. Ibid., 118–19.
60. Ibid., 116–17, 120–21.
61. Voltaire, “On China,” 112–13.
62. Corr examines the religious and theological dimensions of Wolff ’s dispute with the 
Pietists in “Existence of God,” 105–18.
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faiths or the issue of conversion to Christianity, as was still the case with 
Leibniz’s concern with the natural theology of the Chinese.
In his analysis and evaluation of Wolff ’s discourse on the Chinese, 
Louden argues that Wolff ’s interpretation of Confucian ethics was 
strongly influenced by his own ethical commitments, as presented in 
his “German Ethics” of 1720.63 Although it is true that any particular 
way or mode of understanding interprets the other according to its 
own conceptual resources, Wolff ’s procedure is not only an example of 
how philosophers’ own conceptual commitments stand in the way 
of cross-cultural understanding; Wolff ’s ethical commitments are also 
an example of how an account of moral rationality can open a space 
for cross-cultural understanding and dialogue, even if in a limited and 
flawed way.64
Unlike many of his compatriots and most philosophers for the next 
two hundred years, who, like Kant, Hegel, or Marx, would find little of 
value in Chinese thought and culture, Wolff was able to engage Chinese 
thought in a rich and fruitful dialogue that had implications for how 
he conceived the moral and natural world. One reason for this is that 
Wolff ’s rationalism, like that of Leibniz before him, is fundamentally 
experimental and hypothesis-driven.65 It is not enough to look at the 
content of Wolff ’s ethics in order to understand Wolff ’s interpretation 
of the Chinese. Instead, one must consider its ethical modality and ar-
ticulate the context and basis of Wolff ’s approach to Chinese morality; 
that is, his theory of practical and theoretical reason and how it informs 
his hermeneutics.
Conclusion
I have argued that promoting the rationality of the other in interpreta-
tion has been at least partially successful in Leibniz and Wolff ’s writings 
63. Louden, “Confucian Ethics,” 83.
64. Ibid., 81–85.
65. Philosophy proceeds experimentally and hypothetically from the empirical to 
the rational, according to Wolff, in works such as Discursus Praeliminaris de Philosophia 
in Genera § 11–12, § 126–27 / Einleitende Abhandlung über Philosophie im allgemeinen 
(Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2006), 7–8, 75–76.
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concerning China. Despite the considerable limits and misinterpreta-
tions inherent in enlightened authoritarianism and Eurocentric cos-
mopolitanism, to use Mungello’s term, these weaknesses imperfectly 
suggest a critical model for a hermeneutics that is not solely governed 
by suspicion of the beliefs and motives of others. Further, the legacy of 
Leibniz’s encounter with descriptions of Chinese practices and beliefs 
can be further traced in Wolff ’s engagement with Chinese thought, 
and in the early development of hermeneutics in Wolff ’s works and in 
those of his students such as Georg Friedrich Meier. Meier’s rational-
istic hermeneutics was a central point of departure and an object of 
critique for Schleiermacher’s groundbreaking reinterpretation of the art 
of interpretation.
It is a primary characteristic of the development of hermeneu-
tics in Wolff and Meier that hermeneutics, the science of knowing 
meaning from signs, is based in the principle of charity for the sake of 
achieving both justice as well as truth in interpretation.66 According to 
Meier, interpretation presupposes love and justice.67 Interpretation is 
in this sense the opposite of the suspicion that reduces the author to 
an identity that she or he would not recognize. Likewise, the maxim of 
charity is associated with the goal of understanding the author’s inten-
tions in communication, and “understanding better” as identifying the 
truth and validity of what the author has expressed. Even if all interpre-
tation involves a differentiation from the author, Meier insists on differ-
entiating the reciprocal moments of understanding and understanding 
better insofar as the former has priority over the latter out of justice and 
fairness to the author.68
66. On charity or fairness (Billigkeit) in Meier, see A. Bühler and L. C. Madonna’s 
introduction to their edition of G. F. Meier, Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1996), 77–84.
67. Ibid., 77.
68. Ibid., 72–74.
